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Abstract 
In this introduction to the EJSP Special Issue on conspiracy theories as a social psychological 
phenomenon, we describe how this emerging research domain has developed over the past 
decade and distill four basic principles that characterize belief in conspiracy theories. 
Specifically, conspiracy theories are consequential as they have a real impact on people’s 
health, relationships, and safety; they are universal in that belief in them is widespread across 
times, cultures, and social settings; they are emotional given that negative emotions and not 
rational deliberations cause conspiracy beliefs; and they are social as conspiracy beliefs are 
closely associated with psychological motivations underlying intergroup conflict. We then 
discuss future research and possible policy interventions in this growing area of enquiry.   
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Belief in Conspiracy Theories: 
Basic Principles of an Emerging Research Domain 
 Social media and the Internet are filled with conspiracy theories. These theories range 
from highly implausible in light of logic or scientific knowledge (e.g., chemtrail conspiracy 
theories; flat-earth conspiracy theories) to theoretically possible or even plausible (e.g., 
allegations that secret service agencies routinely violate privacy laws). In fact, conspiracy 
theories sometimes turn out to be true (e.g., Watergate; incidents of corporate corruption), 
although the vast majority of conspiracy theories that citizens have believed throughout 
history have been false (Pipes, 1997). Conspiracy theories are commonly defined as 
explanatory beliefs about a group of actors that collude in secret to reach malevolent goals 
(Bale, 2007). What drives belief in such conspiracy theories? While in earlier decades belief 
in conspiracy theories often was dismissed as pathological (Hofstadter, 1966), accumulating 
evidence reveals that conspiracy theories are common among surprisingly large numbers of 
citizens (Oliver & Wood, 2014; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). The potential impact and 
breadth of conspiracy theories was underscored in 2016, when Donald Trump was elected US 
President despite propagating a range of highly implausible conspiracy theories throughout 
his campaign. These theories included allegations that climate change is a hoax perpetrated by 
the Chinese, that Barack Obama was not born in the US, and that vaccines cause autism. The 
social sciences have increasingly recognized the importance of understanding conspiracy 
beliefs, and empirical research on this phenomenon has proliferated in the past decade (for 
overviews, see Douglas, Sutton & Cichocka, 2017; Van Prooijen, 2018; Van Prooijen & Van 
Vugt, in press).  
The current Special Issue was designed to showcase the study of belief in conspiracy 
theories as an emerging research domain within social psychology. In putting this issue 
together, we specifically aimed to capitalize on the momentum that the scientific study of 
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conspiracy theories is currently having, and to give a second generation of conspiracy theory 
researchers within our field the opportunity to disseminate their novel findings to a 
professional audience. To introduce this Special Issue, in the present paper we (a) illuminate 
how the study of conspiracy theories has developed from an unusual object of study to an 
increasingly expanding research domain over the past few years, and (b) distill four basic 
principles that have emerged from past research, in particular that conspiracy beliefs are 
consequential, universal, emotional, and social. Each of the contributions to this Special Issue 
considers at least one of these principles. We conclude by proposing a novel research agenda 
and policy interventions based on these four principles.  
Conspiracy Theories: An Emerging Research Domain 
 Early studies on conspiracy theories relied mostly on correlational evidence in cross-
sectional designs (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap, 1999), or studied conspiracy thinking 
as a function of demographic variables such as political party affiliation (Wright & Arbuthnot, 
1974) or ethnicity (Crocker et al., 1999). Although scarce and methodologically limited, these 
early studies provided two key insights that laid the foundations for current research on 
conspiracy theories. The first key insight is that although conspiracy theories differ widely in 
content, subjective beliefs in them are rooted in the same underlying psychology. This insight 
is suggested by findings that the single best predictor of belief in one conspiracy theory is 
belief in a different conspiracy theory (Goertzel, 1994; see also Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & 
Gignac, 2013; Swami et al., 2011; Sutton & Douglas, 2014). Even beliefs in mutually 
incompatible conspiracy theories are positively correlated (e.g., Princess Diana was murdered 
vs. Princess Diana staged her own death; Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012). While many 
conceptually distinct conspiracy theories exist, the tendency to believe in them appears to be 
underpinned by broader beliefs that support conspiracy theories in general (e.g., beliefs in 
cover ups; Wood et al., 2012). Some scholars argue for a conspiracy mindset as a relatively 
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stable predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories that varies between persons (Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2014). Despite the high variability in conspiracy theories—involving topics that range 
from climate change to chronic illnesses to terrorist attacks—research demonstrates that 
largely similar and predictable psychological processes drive people’s belief in them.  
 The second key insight is that besides individual differences, belief in conspiracy 
theories is highly sensitive to social context. For instance, ideological motivations influence 
political conspiracy beliefs depending on election results (e.g., Democrats believe 
governmental conspiracy theories particularly if there is a Republican in the White House, 
and vice versa; Wright & Arbutnot, 1974; see also Golec de Zavala & Federico, this Volume; 
Uscinski & Parent, 2014; Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). Moreover, throughout history people 
have believed conspiracy theories particularly in impactful societal crisis situations, such as 
during fires, floods, earthquakes, rapid societal change, violence, and wars (McCauley & 
Jacques, 1979; see also Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). Finally, social structures that shape 
citizens’ feelings of vulnerability increase belief in conspiracy theories, as reflected in 
findings that feelings of powerlessness predict conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 
1999; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014), and that conspiracy beliefs are high particularly among 
members of stigmatized minority groups (Crocker et al., 1999; Davis, Wetherell, & Henry, 
this Volume; Van Prooijen, Staman, & Krouwel, in press).  
 Recent research has drawn heavily on these two key insights, by extensively testing 
how stable individual differences predict a tendency to believe conspiracy theories (Darwin, 
Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Inhoff & Bruder, 2014; Swami et al., 2011; Van Prooijen, 2017), 
what causal factors increase belief in conspiracy theories (e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Van 
Prooijen & Van Dijk, 2016; Whitson & Galinksy, 2008), what basic cognitive processes are 
involved when people perceive conspiracies (Douglas et al., 2016; Van Prooijen, Douglas, & 
De Inocencio, 2018), and what the consequences are of believing conspiracy theories (Bartlett 
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& Miller, 2010; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b; Douglas & Leite, 2017). It is safe to say 
that the scientific study of conspiracy theories has been emerging over the past decade: Both 
the body of knowledge on this phenomenon, as well as the number of researchers actively 
working on it, has expanded rapidly.  
 One limitation of the current state of affairs in the scientific research domain of 
conspiracy theories, however, is that the field is lacking a solid theoretical framework that 
contextualizes previous findings, that enables novel predictions, and that suggests 
interventions to reduce the prevalence of conspiracy theories in society. Recent review 
articles have sought to address this limitation by providing a framework that illuminates the 
motivational basis of conspiracy theories—specifically that conspiracy theories appeal to 
people for epistemic, existential and social motivational reasons (Douglas et al., 2017), and by 
developing an evolutionary model—the Adaptive Conspiracism Hypothesis—that specifies 
how the human tendency to believe conspiracy theories evolved through natural selection 
(Van Prooijen & Van Vugt, in press). These initiatives notwithstanding, at present the field of 
conspiracy theories is still in its infancy in terms of theory development. To stimulate further 
theorizing, we propose four basic principles of belief in conspiracy theories that we distilled 
from research conducted so far. These four basic principles are supported by many studies 
and, in conjunction with existing models, may provide an organizing framework for 
researchers to develop more sophisticated theories and research on this phenomenon. 
Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Four Basic Principles 
 The four basic principles that we put forward here specify and expand the two key 
insights discussed earlier—that is, (a) belief in different conspiracy theories is driven by 
similar psychological processes, and (b) conspiracy beliefs are highly susceptible to social 
context. We specifically detail what particular antecedents and consequences are involved in 
the psychological processes underlying belief in conspiracy theories, and how social context 
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influences people’s susceptibility to conspiracy theories. Explicitly, we argue that beliefs in 
conspiracy theories are consequential, universal, emotional, and social. In the following 
sections, we discuss each of these basic principles in turn.   
Principle 1: Conspiracy Beliefs are Consequential 
 Even when conspiracy theories are highly unlikely to be true, they have an impact on 
important life dimensions such as health, interpersonal relationships, and safety. This impact 
is rooted in the subjective reality of belief. What people believe drives their behavior; but 
while beliefs sometimes may be flawed or even naive, they may produce behavior that has 
real consequences (cf. the Thomas Theorem; Thomas & Thomas, 1928). One dimension in 
particular where conspiracy theories are consequential—and usually detrimental—for 
perceivers is their health. To illustrate this, imagine for a moment that vaccines actually do 
cause autism. Who would get themselves and their children vaccinated under those 
circumstances? But while medical scientists widely agree that vaccines do not cause autism, 
many citizens firmly believe that the pharmaceutical industry conspires to hide the evidence 
for such a relationship. This motivates these citizens to deny themselves and their children 
important vaccines. Empirical research underscores such detrimental health consequences of 
conspiracy theories for believers: Exposing research participants to anti-vaccine conspiracy 
theories lowers their intentions to have a child vaccinated (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). 
Moreover, these findings are not specific for health-related conspiracy theories: More general 
conspiracy beliefs predict a preference for alternative over regular, evidence-based medical 
approaches (Lamberty & Imhoff, in press).  
Furthermore, a surprisingly common conspiracy theory among the African American 
population is that contraceptives are a form of Black genocide. Belief in this conspiracy 
theory shapes negative attitudes towards contraceptives and predicts decreased use of 
contraceptives particularly among men (Thorburn & Bogart, 2005). Relatedly, in South 
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Africa AIDS conspiracy theories are common—stipulating for instance that HIV was 
deliberately created by humans in the laboratory, and that the pharmaceutical industry 
promotes the “HIV hypothesis” to sell expensive yet harmful antiretroviral drugs. These 
conspiracy beliefs are reliably associated with unscientific and dangerous beliefs such as that 
HIV is harmless, or that condom use causes HIV infections. A study conducted in Cape Town 
reveals that belief in such AIDS conspiracy theories strongly predicts reduced condom use 
among both men and women (Grebe & Nattrass, 2012). In fact, one convinced believer of 
AIDS conspiracy theories was Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa from 1999 to 2008. 
Statistical model estimates indicate that in the period between 2000 and 2005, approximately 
330,000 South African people died due to governmental decisions not to implement 
antiretroviral treatment programs (Chigwedere, Seage, Gruskin, Lee, & Essex, 2008).  
Belief in conspiracy theories also has implications for people’s interpersonal 
relationships. It has been noted that people who believe conspiracy theories can be subject to 
stigmatization (Harambam & Aupers, 2015). Consistently, expressing conspiracy theories 
increases expectations of negative evaluations, and fear of being socially excluded (Lantian, 
Muller, Nurra, Klein, Berjot, & Pantazi, this Volume). Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
belief in conspiracy theories is associated with problematic interpersonal relationships. 
Specifically, belief in conspiracy theories is correlated with a range of individual difference 
variables that reflect impoverished interpersonal functioning, such as interpersonal paranoia 
(Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011), narcissism (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 
2016), disagreeableness (Swami et al., 2011), insecure attachment (Green & Douglas, 2018) 
and Machiavellianism (Douglas & Sutton, 2011). While future research would need to 
examine the causal effects of conspiracy beliefs on the quality of interpersonal relationships 
more directly, the findings obtained so far are consistent with the idea that endorsing 
conspiracy theories is associated with poorer interpersonal functioning.  
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Conspiracy beliefs also have implications for a range of societal developments. For 
instance, conspiracy beliefs predict feelings of alienation from politics (Goertzel, 1994), and 
correspondingly, a manipulation of conspiracy theories decreased participants’ willingness to 
vote in elections (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; Study 1). Relatedly, exposure to conspiracy 
theories decreases public support for important policies. Climate change conspiracy 
theories—which typically assume that the problem of global warming is a hoax—decrease 
citizens’ willingness to reduce their carbon footprints (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; Study 2; see 
also Douglas & Sutton, 2015), as well as their prosocial behavior more generally (Van der 
Linden, 2015). Furthermore, conspiracy beliefs are empirically associated with populism 
(Silva, Vegetti, & Littvay, 2017) and political extremism (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 
2015). Also ‘underground’ extremist movements (e.g., groups of Neo-Nazis, violent anti-
globalists, religious fundamentalists, and the like) are characterized by excessive conspiracy 
beliefs. Bartlett and Miller (2010) argued that conspiracy theories causally contribute to the 
process of radicalization, and the violent tendencies, of such extremist fringe groups.  
The above arguments paint a rather bleak picture of the consequences of conspiracy 
theories and conspiracy beliefs, and indeed, the current state of affairs in this research domain 
suggests that the majority of consequences are negative. It should be noted, however, that not 
all consequences are necessarily negative. For instance, conspiracy theories can inspire and 
justify protest movements (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; see also Chayinska, Minescu, & Colucci, 
this Volume), and whether that is positive or negative depends on the type of social change 
that these movements pursue. Furthermore, conspiracy theories can increase governmental 
transparency (Clarke, 2002), and belief in conspiracy theories is associated with increased 
support for democratic principles (Swami et al., 2011). Indeed, a fruitful avenue for further 
research would be to study under what circumstances conspiracy theories are harmful, 
harmless, or even beneficial. Whether one wishes to focus on the upside or downside of 
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conspiracy theories, one conclusion remains: Conspiracy theories influence citizens, and the 
society they live in, in significant ways.    
Principle 2: Conspiracy Beliefs are Universal 
 Conspiracy theories are not restricted to specific times or cultures: Citizens around the 
world are susceptible to them, from modern to traditional societies (West & Sanders, 2003). 
Indeed, the tendency to be suspicious of the possibility that others are forming conspiracies 
against one and one’s group may be part of human nature. The Adaptive Conspiracism 
Hypothesis proposes that while conspiracy theories are not necessarily adaptive in modern 
environments, they have been adaptive among ancient hunter-gatherers who faced the 
problem of frequent intergroup conflict and substantial reproductive loss through coalitional 
aggression (Van Prooijen & Van Vugt, in press). This model asserts that human beings 
evolved a conspiracy detection system, that is, a functionally integrated mental system that is 
activated by specific cues associated with an increased likelihood of hostile coalitions (that is, 
actual conspiracies), and that produces adaptive outputs to protect ancestral humans from 
dangerous conspiracies.    
 While this perspective does not imply that all human beings believe conspiracy 
theories to an equal extent—individuals, groups, and cultures differ in the extent to which the 
conspiracy detection system is chronically and situationally activated, as is the case with 
many other evolved psychological predispositions (Buss, 2009)—it does imply that 
conspiracy theories are not specific to our modern digital age, or to one particular culture. 
Empirical evidence supports this view. In their analysis of over a hundred thousand letters 
sent to major US newspapers between 1890 and 2010, Uscinski and Parent (2014) did not 
find increased conspiracy theorizing in letters published in the new Millennium; instead, 
conspiracy theorizing was remarkably stable over a full 120 years. Also Andeweg (2014) 
found that—contrary to popular belief—satisfaction with politicians did not decrease in an 
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almost 40-year measurement period (starting in the early 1970s) in multiple EU countries. 
Instead, citizens’ overall satisfaction with politicians has been low throughout the decades.  
Historical sources suggest that substantial numbers of citizens believed conspiracy 
theories even further back in time. Throughout the centuries, wars were characterized by 
excessive and mutual conspiracy theories between enemy groups (Pipes, 1997). In Medieval 
times, conspiracy theories led to major tragedies including the killing of Jews (who were for 
instance accused of conspiring to poison drinking wells, as a means of explaining disease 
epidemics) or Witch hunts (i.e., young women who were accused of conspiring with the Devil 
and therefore burnt alive). One can even find conspiracy theories in the writings of the ancient 
Roman senator and historian Tacitus (Annal XV, 38-44), who described how Roman citizens 
believed that Nero and his loyal servants deliberately had ignited the great fire of Rome in the 
year 64 AD (for details, see Brotherton, 2015; Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017).  
 Conspiracy theories also appear common to all cultures. While most research 
conducted thus far on this topic has taken place in Western societies (mostly the US and 
Western Europe), conspiracy theories are by no means exclusive to these societies. 
Quantitative research has found evidence for widespread conspiracy beliefs in countries 
around the world, including Poland (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012), Ukraine (Chayinska 
et al., this Volume), Malaysia (Swami, 2012), Indonesia (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015), and the 
Muslim world in the Middle East (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004). Ethnographic studies have 
found substantial conspiracy theorizing in rural Africa (e.g., Namibia; Tanzania) where 
people endorse a range of conspiracy theories that implicate societal elites, that accuse enemy 
tribes of witchcraft, or that involve malpractice of the Western world. For instance, many 
citizens in these regions believe that modern technology is a form of sorcery designed by 
hostile Western plots to harm or control them (West & Sanders, 2003). Relatedly, 
anthropologists have observed conspiracy theories among the Yanomamö Amazon Indians in 
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South America, who sometimes blame the mysterious death of a tribe member on sorcery 
committed by a conspiracy of an enemy village (Chagnon, 1988).    
 Finally, conspiracy theories emerge across a wide variety of social settings. 
Conspiracy theories commonly accuse governmental institutions (e.g., politicians in general, 
or secret service agencies), and entire branches of industry (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry; 
the oil industry) of malpractice. Furthermore, conspiracy theories often accuse minority 
groups, such as Muslims or Jews, of hostile plots to plan a revolution (Pipes, 1997). But 
conspiracy theories also occur in more micro-level settings. Several studies have revealed that 
conspiracy theories are common in organizations, where employees suspect their managers of 
conspiring towards evil goals (e.g., conspiracy theories that managers have a hidden agenda to 
lay off employees, in order to give themselves a financial bonus; see Douglas & Leite, 2017; 
Van Prooijen & De Vries, 2016). Although research on the variety of settings in which people 
believe conspiracy theories is scarce at present, we suspect that conspiracy theories are 
prevalent also in other domains of social life such as sports (e.g., suspicions that the opposing 
team bribed the referee, or that supporters of the opposing team plan riots), schools (e.g., 
suspicions among high-school students that teachers conspire against them to make exams 
more difficult), and so on. In any setting characterized by psychological tensions between 
competing (sub-)groups, conspiracy theories are likely to occur.     
Principle 3: Conspiracy Beliefs are Emotional 
 The third principle is partly grounded in a paradox: Conspiracy theories—even 
blatantly irrational ones—are often supported by a range of elaborate arguments, suggesting 
that belief in conspiracy theories is based on analytic and deliberative (i.e., System 2) thinking 
processes. For instance, Moon landing conspiracy theories (assuming that the Moon landings 
were filmed in a TV studio) often are justified through an extensive analysis of the lack of 
wind on the moon in conjunction with the apparent movement of the US flag on video 
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recordings. Likewise, many 9/11 conspiracy theories (proposing that these terrorist attacks 
were an inside job committed by the US government) are based on a range of scientific 
arguments pertaining to the steel constructions of the former Twin Towers, the maximum 
temperatures of burning kerosene, and the temperatures at which steel melts. It would 
therefore be tempting to assume that belief in conspiracy theories is closely associated with an 
inquisitive mindset that does not take for granted the official readings of impactful events, and 
that critically analyses evidence in favor of, or against, a conspiracy theory.     
Empirical evidence, however, suggests quite the opposite. For example, belief in 
conspiracy theories is positively associated with intuitive rather than analytic thinking 
(Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014). Consistently, higher education predicts 
lower conspiracy beliefs, a finding that is partly mediated by a tendency among the less 
educated to attribute agency and intentionality where it does not exist (Douglas et al., 2016), 
and stronger analytic thinking skills among the higher educated (Van Prooijen, 2017). 
Furthermore, the combination of analytic thinking and the motivation to be rational predicts 
skepticism of conspiracy theories (Ståhl & Van Prooijen, 2018). It has also been noted that 
the confirmation bias is central to conspiracy theorizing (Brotherton, 2015), and that 
conspiracy beliefs are related to the illusion of explanatory depth (Vitriol & Marsh, this 
Volume).  
Conspiracy beliefs therefore do not appear to be grounded in controlled, analytic 
mental processes. Instead, we argue that they are grounded in emotional and intuitive mental 
(System 1) processes. This insight is based on the argument that aversive emotional 
experiences increase people’s sense-making motivations (Park, 2010). These sense-making 
motivations tend to be sensitive to threats, increasing the likelihood that people attribute 
suspect events to the covert activities of hostile conspiracies (Hofstadter, 1966). This line of 
reasoning is consistent with the observation that conspiracy theories gain momentum in the 
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context of anxiety-provoking societal crisis events such as terrorism, natural disasters, or war 
(Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). The negative emotions that constitute the psychological 
origins of belief in conspiracy theories include anxiety, uncertainty, or the feeling that one 
lacks control.  
Both correlational and experimental studies extensively support the emotional nature 
of belief in conspiracy theories. For instance, conspiracy beliefs are correlated with trait 
anxiety (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013), and are predicted by the perception that society is under 
threat (Jolley, Douglas & Sutton, 2018), and that society’s fundamental values are changing 
(Federico, Williams, & Vitriol, this Volume). Experimental studies have found that inducing a 
lack of control increases people’s belief in organizational conspiracy theories (Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008) and political conspiracy theories (Van Prooijen & Acker, 2016). Relatedly, a 
lack of control leads people to exaggerate the influence that they attribute to their enemies, 
which is part of many conspiracy theories (Sullivan et al., 2010). Finally, experiencing 
subjective uncertainty—a phenomenological experience closely associated with lacking 
control—predicts increased conspiracy beliefs, provided that perceivers consider the 
implicated authorities as immoral (Van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, Galinsky, & 
Kay, 2015).      
 The sense-making processes underlying the relationship between emotions and 
conspiracy beliefs consist of at least two basic and automatic cognitive processes. The first 
process is pattern perception: People automatically search for meaningful and causal 
relationships between stimuli. Research indeed finds that perceiving patterns in random 
stimuli predicts belief in conspiracy theories (Van der Wal, Sutton, Lange, & Braga, this 
Volume; Van Prooijen, Douglas, & De Inocencio, 2018). The second process is agency 
detection: People tend to perceive events as caused by intentional agents. The tendency to 
detect agency in inanimate stimuli empirically predicts belief in conspiracy theories (Douglas, 
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Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). These two basic cognitive 
processes are reliably triggered by the same emotions that trigger conspiracy beliefs. For 
instance, lacking control not only increases belief in conspiracy theories but also illusory 
pattern perception more generally (e.g., seeing images in random noise, or perceiving patterns 
in random stock market information; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). In a similar vein, feelings 
of uncertainty not only increase conspiracy beliefs but also other forms of agency detection, 
such as people’s belief in agentic, moralizing gods (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). While 
the automatic and epistemic mental processes of pattern perception and agency detection are 
not emotional per se, aversive emotional experiences do activate these cognitive processes, 
increasing the likelihood of conspiracy thinking. Taken together, the evidence suggests that 
belief in conspiracy theories is strongly rooted in negative emotions and automatic processes. 
The cold, non-emotional states generally associated with analytic thinking appear to decrease 
people’s belief in conspiracy theories.     
Principle 4: Conspiracy Beliefs are Social 
 Conspiracy theories are a social phenomenon in that they reflect the basic structure of 
intergroup conflict. Conceptually, beliefs qualify as conspiracy theories only when they 
involve assumptions of a hostile and threatening outgroup or coalition (Van Prooijen & Van 
Vugt, in press). Moreover, these conspiracies typically plan to harm or deceive not just one 
individual but a wider collective, as is the case with conspiracy theories implicating political 
organizations, branches of industry, minority groups, managers, and so on. Accordingly, 
conspiracy beliefs flourish among members of groups who are involved in mutual conflict 
(Pipes, 1997). Consistently, while belief in conspiracy theories is empirically related to 
feelings of paranoia (e.g., Darwin et al., 2011), paranoia and conspiracy theories differ in one 
respect: Paranoia is self-relevant and necessarily pertains to suspected hostility against a 
perceiver personally, but instead, conspiracy theories are usually conceived of as intergroup 
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beliefs that assume a powerful or hostile outgroup is conspiring against a perceiver’s ingroup 
(Imhoff & Lamberty, this Volume; Van Prooijen & Van Lange, 2014).  
Conspiracy beliefs are therefore associated with common motivations that drive 
intergroup conflict. Two social motivations in particular are relevant for conspiracy thinking. 
The first motivation is to uphold a strong ingroup identity, which increases perceivers’ sense-
making motivation when they believe their group is under threat by outside forces. That is, 
people worry about possible conspiracies only when they feel strongly connected with, and 
hence care about, the prospective victims of these conspiracies. The second social motivation 
is to protect against a coalition or outgroup suspected to be hostile. This outgroup typically 
has some threatening quality, such as power (e.g., politicians; managers) or negative 
stereotypes (e.g., minority groups) which reinforces people’s suspicion towards these groups 
(Douglas et al., 2017; Van Prooijen & Van Lange, 2014). Thus, the combination of a strong 
ingroup identity and a sense of outgroup threat characterize the social dimension of 
conspiracy beliefs. These motivations are clearly visible in the political arena, where 
Republicans often believe conspiracy theories involving Democrats trying to harm 
Republicans, and Democrats often believe conspiracy theories involving Republicans trying 
to harm Democrats (Uscinski & Parent, 2014; see also Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). These 
effects increase to the extent that people are more polarized in their political ideologies (Van 
Prooijen et al., 2015).  
 Empirical research extensively supports these group-based qualities of conspiracy 
theories. One source of evidence comes from research on individual differences: Traits that 
are associated with an increased likelihood of perceiving intergroup conflict also predict 
increased belief in conspiracy theories. One relevant line of research focused on collective 
narcissism, that is, exaggerated belief in the greatness of one’s ingroup. Feelings of ingroup 
superiority imply that competing outgroups are considered inferior, which may include the 
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moral inferiority that the main actors in conspiracy theories are assumed to have. Higher 
scores of collective narcissism indeed predict conspiracy theories that implicate competing 
outgroups (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec De Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016). Furthermore, 
collective narcissism at the national level predicts how conspiracy beliefs about opposing 
political parties develop over time during a political election campaign (Golec de Zavala & 
Federico, this Volume).  
While findings on collective narcissism primarily emphasize how a strong ingroup 
identity—in the form of feelings of ingroup superiority—predicts belief in conspiracy 
theories, other individual difference traits are more directly linked with a structural tendency 
to perceive outgroups as threatening. Two key individual difference variables commonly 
connected to stereotyping and intergroup conflict are authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation. Several studies have found positive relationships between belief in specific 
conspiracy theories and these two individual difference variables (Abalakina-Paap et al., 
1999; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Swami, 2012). In sum, people who are dispositionally likely to 
perceive their ingroup as superior or to perceive outgroups as threatening display increased 
belief in conspiracy theories.  
Furthermore, experimental studies support the idea that the two key ingredients of 
intergroup conflict—a strong ingroup identity and a sense of outgroup threat—jointly 
stimulate belief in conspiracy theories. For instance, taking the perspective of members of a 
group increases belief in conspiracy theories, but only after receiving information that the 
group is under threat (Van Prooijen & Van Dijk, 2014). Likewise, self-uncertainty predicts 
increased conspiracy beliefs, but only among people who feel included in a group (Van 
Prooijen, 2016). These studies suggest that a strong ingroup identity increases conspiracy 
theories, but only in conjunction with a sense of threat. Experimental studies conducted in 
Indonesia yielded similar conclusions. People whose Muslim identity was made salient 
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believed conspiracy theories—blaming terrorist attacks in Indonesia on a Western 
conspiracy—more strongly than people whose Muslim identity was not made salient, but only 
when the West was described as threatening to Muslims (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015). 
Finally, basic sense-making processes predict conspiracy theories only when a hostile 
outgroup is salient (Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska, 2018).   
 Stigmatized minority groups constitute societal examples where these intergroup 
motivations often are salient. Such groups tend to be highly cohesive, and hence have a strong 
ingroup identity; at the same time, stigmatized minority groups often suffer from group-based 
oppression and discrimination by a more powerful majority group. One would therefore 
predict that stigmatized minority group members believe conspiracy theories more strongly 
than majority group members. Research indeed has found substantial conspiracy theorizing 
among members of minority groups (Goertzel, 1994; Thorburn & Bogart, 2005). 
Furthermore, stigmatized minority group members believe both identity-relevant and identity-
irrelevant conspiracy theories more strongly than majority group members (Van Prooijen et 
al., in press). These effects emerge because minority group members blame the system for 
realistic problems of their community (i.e., discrimination; see Crocker et al., 1999) and 
because of a chronic sense of social devaluation (Davis et al., this Volume). The social 
motivations described here provide an explanation why members of marginalized minority 
groups are particularly likely to believe in conspiracy theories.   
Taken together, the findings reviewed in this section underscore the social qualities of 
conspiracy theories. Even when beliefs in conspiracy theories do not always have prosocial 
consequences (as illuminated in the section arguing that conspiracy beliefs are consequential), 
they originate from basic social motivations that characterize intergroup conflict, namely to 
uphold a strong ingroup identity and to protect against a threatening outgroup.     
Conclusions, Future Research, and Practical Implications 
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 In the present contribution, our aims were to review the literature of the emerging 
research domain of conspiracy theories, and to distill four basic principles that characterize 
belief in such theories. These four basic principles follow from a surge of empirical research 
on this phenomenon that has been conducted in the past decade, and also are reflected in the 
contributions to this Special Issue. At the same time, more theorizing and research is needed 
to further develop the psychology of conspiracy theories as a fully-fledged research field. In 
the following section, we propose some possibilities for future research based on these four 
organizing principles.  
Future Research 
 Focusing first on consequences, whilst it is clear that conspiracy beliefs can have 
major ramifications for perceivers and their social environment, theorizing on this 
phenomenon would benefit from more carefully crafted experiments that manipulate 
conspiracy theories (cf. Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b; Douglas & Leite, 2017). This would 
enable researchers to establish the exact psychological processes through which conspiracy 
theories and belief in conspiracy theories are consequential. This is important, because only a 
fine-grained understanding of these possible consequences, as well as the conditions under 
which they are strong or weak, will enable practitioners to estimate the risks of particular 
conspiracy theories and the need to implement preventive interventions. Furthermore, in 
experimental studies of conspiracy theories, behavioral measurements are also lacking (for an 
exception, see Van der Linden, 2015). For instance, does exposure to conspiracy theories 
influence cooperative behavior in economic games? Likewise, do conspiracy theories causally 
impact antisocial behaviors such as aggression and egoism, but also prosocial behaviors such 
as helping and altruism? Experimental studies on such questions would complement existing 
insights on the consequences of conspiracy theories in significant ways.  
 Next, whilst the available evidence supports the principle that conspiracy beliefs are 
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universal, research needs to more directly and explicitly examine the distal, evolutionary roots 
of the human tendency to believe conspiracy theories. For instance, while anecdotes exist of 
conspiracy theories in contemporary hunter-gatherer societies (Chagnon, 1988), and 
ethnographic studies suggest that citizens in all cultures investigated so far believe conspiracy 
theories (West & Sanders, 2003), systematic research on conspiracy theories in traditional 
societies is currently lacking. The Adaptive Conspiracism Hypothesis asserts that conspiracy 
theories have been functional in ancient hunter-gatherer societies to protect against the perils 
of intergroup conflict (Van Prooijen & Van Vugt, in press). Such lethal intergroup conflict 
still characterizes many traditional societies: For instance, Walker and Bailey (2013) 
examined violence in 11 traditional societies in South America and found that an estimated 
average of 30% of adults in these societies dies through violence, mostly committed by 
hostile coalitions. Do citizens of violent traditional societies believe conspiracy theories more 
strongly than citizens of more peaceful traditional societies? And, how functional are 
conspiracy beliefs in traditional societies to cope with coalitional dangers, as for instance 
reflected in survival rates and offspring? While these questions appear to be the domain of 
evolutionary anthropology, they are important to understand why conspiracy theories are such 
a universal feature of human psychology.  
 Next, research on the emotional roots of conspiracy belief is restricted to 
experimentally inducing experiences of threat (e.g., Jolley et al., 2018; Van Prooijen & Acker, 
2015; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) or to measuring threatening or emotional experiences (e.g., 
Jolley et al., 2018; Federico et al., this Volume; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013). We would 
advocate more sophisticated methodologies to study emotions, and particularly recommend a 
physiological approach to understand the relationship between emotions and belief in 
conspiracy theories. For instance, the amygdala is commonly associated with threat 
experiences, and accordingly, bilateral amygdala volume has been found to predict people’s 
Running Head: CONSPIRACY THEORIES  21 
tendency to justify the political system that they live in (Nam, Jost, Kaggen, Campbell-
Meiklejohn, & Van Bavel, 2018). As such, brain-imaging methodology could test the 
prediction that amygdala volume is associated with conspiracy thinking. Likewise, the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is associated with higher-order cognitive processes 
such as analytic thinking (e.g., Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), and 
research therefore might examine whether activation of this region predicts belief in, or rather 
skepticism of, conspiracy theories. Finally, research may examine if belief in conspiracy 
theories is related with activation of the sympathetic nervous system, or with the release of 
hormones associated with stress (i.e., cortisol) and intergroup competition (i.e., testosterone).  
 Regarding the social aspects of conspiracy beliefs, a useful extension would be to 
focus on actual, real-life conflict between competing groups. While it has been noted that 
most wars in which humans have fought have been characterized by excessive conspiracy 
theorizing on both sides of the conflict, the evidence for this assertion comes mainly from 
historical sources (Pipes, 1997). As such, empirical research could examine conspiracy 
theories among existing groups that are involved in intractable, and sometimes violent 
conflict (e.g., Palestinians vs. Israelis). Predictions that would follow from existing research 
are that (a) many citizens on both sides of the conflict should have substantial conspiracy 
beliefs about covert activities of the enemy group, (b) these conspiracy beliefs should be 
relatively stronger among members of the (military or politically) “weaker” group in the 
conflict, and (c) these effects should be particularly pronounced among citizens with a strong 
ingroup identity. Furthermore, longitudinal designs to investigate how conspiracy beliefs 
develop over time are currently scarce (for exceptions, see Golec de Zavala & Federico, this 
Volume; Vitriol & Marsh, this Volume). For instance, assessing conspiracy beliefs at multiple 
time points—ideally, pre-conflict, during conflict, and post-conflict—would allow researchers 
to examine the temporal dynamics of the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and 
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intergroup conflict. Such a longitudinal approach can also establish whether or not conspiracy 
beliefs cause intergroup conflict or vice versa, and what exact role conspiracy theories and 
conspiracy beliefs play in initiating or prolonging intergroup hostilities (cf. Bartlett & Miller, 
2010). 
 Finally, while our discussion of the social qualities of conspiracy beliefs has mainly 
focused on intergroup conflict, conspiracy beliefs are also social in the sense that they are 
highly susceptible to social influence. For instance, online communities selectively spread 
conspiracy theories that confirm the pre-existing beliefs of its members (Del Vicario et al., 
2016). Furthermore, through cultural transmission conspiracy theories can turn into historical 
narratives among citizens, which may perpetuate even when the events that triggered the 
conspiracy theory are no longer salient or threatening (Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). An 
example is the assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Belief in JFK conspiracy theories 
within the US has increased over the decades. Given the number of people who believe in 
them (in recent figures still more than 60% of the US adult population; Swift, 2013), they are 
likely endorsed by many people who were not even born when JFK was assassinated. Yet, 
much is still unknown about how social influence shapes conspiracy beliefs. For instance, 
what determines if conspiracy theories spread to a large audience, and what makes them 
persuasive? What are the characteristics of “successful” conspiracy theories that people still 
believe years after the events that inspired them? Particularly in the current digital age where 
information spreads faster than ever before, examining social influence processes in 
conspiracy beliefs may be a promising avenue for future research.      
Practical Implications 
 An important task of psychology as a scientific discipline is to inform policy-makers 
how to responsibly influence the behavior of citizens based on empirical findings and 
theoretical insights. That conspiracy theories are consequential and universal underscores a 
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need for interventions: If most of the consequences of conspiracy theories in modern societies 
are harmful, and if conspiracy theories are widespread in the population, policy-makers have 
good reason to take this phenomenon seriously. This does not imply, of course, that our 
society should abandon efforts to combat actual corruption, or that citizens should uncritically 
accept any policy proposal of power holders. But, it does imply that many conspiracy theories 
are irrational yet impactful and harmful, and hence, it is functional to reduce belief in 
conspiracy theories that are unlikely to be true.  
That conspiracy theories are emotional and social offers practical tools for policy-makers 
to develop evidence-based interventions that help to reduce the appeal of conspiracy theories 
among citizens. First, because belief in conspiracy theories is to some extent rooted in 
emotions, interventions could instead promote analytic thinking among the public. Research 
indeed reveals that experimental manipulations designed to stimulate analytic thinking 
decrease conspiracy beliefs (Swami et al., 2014). Furthermore, providing rational arguments 
against specific conspiracy theories reduces belief in them (Orosz, Krekં, Paskuj, Tંth-
Király, Böthe, & Roland-Lévy, 2016), and can improve behavioral intentions (Jolley & 
Douglas, 2017). This suggests that initiatives to refute implausible conspiracy theories (e.g., 
informing the public what actual experts and witnesses have to say about pseudo-scientific ‘9-
11 for truth’ conspiracy theories; Dunbar & Reagan, 2011) do make a difference.  
The second is to instill feelings of security among the public, and provide them with a 
sense of hope and empowerment. For instance, if experiencing a lack of control increases 
conspiracy beliefs, does experiencing empowerment, that is, a high sense of control, reduce 
conspiracy beliefs? Research suggests that this is indeed the case. Van Prooijen and Acker 
(2015) found reduced conspiracy beliefs after activating a high sense of control as compared 
to a neutral baseline condition. Likewise, Whitson, Kim, Wang, Menon, and Webster (in 
press) found similar effects of inducing a promotion focus in participants, and these effects 
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were attributable to increased feelings of control. Future research may expand on the 
ameliorating effects of more discrete positive emotional experiences on conspiracy beliefs: 
For instance, are citizens less suspicious of governmental information messages that contain 
humor? And, are citizens more likely to develop conspiracy theories about pessimistic as 
opposed to optimistic leaders? For now, evidence suggests that interventions designed to 
increase analytic thinking and decrease negative emotions may effectively reduce conspiracy 
beliefs.   
While research focusing on the social dimension of conspiracy theories has not yet 
directly examined how these motivations may be utilized to reduce citizens’ belief in them, an 
extensive literature exists on how to reduce conflict between groups. For instance, under some 
circumstances intergroup contact has been found to improve intergroup relations (Allport, 
1954). Based on these insights, research may for instance examine whether direct contact 
between politicians and citizens decreases belief in political conspiracy theories. Specifically, 
it might be beneficial for public trust if politicians regularly get out of parliament and discuss 
policy with citizens directly. In a related fashion, emphasizing a superordinate ingroup 
identity—for instance by engaging in cooperative tasks—may improve intergroup relations 
(Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, Rust, 1993). This insight might be relevant for the 
observation that conspiracy beliefs are particularly prevalent among stigmatized minority 
groups (Crocker et al., 1999; Davis et al., this Volume; Van Prooijen et al., in press). 
Furthermore, among majority group members many conspiracy theories exist in which 
minority groups are the suspected conspirators (e.g., Pipes, 1997). Efforts to reduce prejudice 
and discrimination hence are likely to decrease belief in conspiracy theories both among and 
about minority group members. While preliminary at this point, these considerations suggest 
that the social qualities of conspiracy theories provide promising avenues for policy 
interventions.       
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Concluding Remarks 
The scientific study of belief in conspiracy theories has developed rapidly in the past 
decade. This development has taken place in the wake of a growing public awareness that 
conspiracy theories are not exclusive to a few fringe groups or eccentric individuals, but are 
widespread and have a major impact on society. By organizing the present Special Issue, and 
by articulating the four basic principles of this research domain in the present contribution, we 
hope to further stimulate research and inspire other researchers to start working on this 
important topic. As illuminated in our agenda for future research and policy interventions, 
there is still much unexplored territory to be discovered in the psychology of conspiracy 
theories, and scientists and policy-makers need to collaborate closely to address this 
phenomenon effectively. We hope that in the end, the empirical contributions to this Special 
Issue will contribute to decreased conspiracy thinking, and an increased emphasis on logic 
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